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Summary  findings
Transfers to the rural land-poor are widely advocated  transfers (assumed to be proportional  to current  output
and used in attempts to reduce rural poverty. Such  per acre on owned land) and a poverty measure (derived
transfers are believed to be productive,  in that the final  from a standard poverty profile).
gain to the poor exceeds the initial transfer. The  After applying this approach to new data for rural
evidence cited most often to support this view is the  Bangladesh, they find that landholding class is a relevant
negative correlation  between output per acre and the size  indicator for targeting. Under ideal conditions,
of the holding. In other words, small farms appear to be  redistribution  from land-rich to land-poor households
more productive.  will reduce aggregate poverty in rural Bangladesh (cven
There are reasons to question that evidence, however,  without productivity effects). And transfers from an
say Ravallion and Binayak Sen. It is unclear, for example,  external budget would have the greatest impact on
how much differences in productivity are really  poverty if they were concentrated  on landiless,  marginal
attributed to unmentioned  differences in land quality  farmers. Moreover,  productivity effects tconsistent with
(someone might be given a iarger plot of poor land so  the relationship between farm size and productivity in
that a living can be made from it). Other factors also  Bangladesh) imply an additional impact on rural poverty
constrain the impact on poverty of land-based targeting,  when transters are made from land-rich to land-poor
notably incentive constraint,  (whereby the "land-rich"  households.
alter their behavior to gain from the policy) and political  But the gains are modest, even if one postulates
economy constraints  (whereby the land-rich undermine  virtually unheard-of  powers of redistribution across
the policy by creating political pressure for tradeoffs).  landholding classes. Depending on the initial conditions
To inform the d;bate,  Ravallion and Sen quantify the  of agricultural technology, and the relative productivity
potential gains from land-based targeting under  effects among the landless, they estimate that the
seemingly ideal conditions,  incorporating only a limited  maximunm  impact on rural poverty from land-based
set of constraints on such a policy. Their aim is to  targetipg under revenue neutrality is equivalent to a
quantify gains to the poor from a benchmark policy  uniform lump-sum transfer of between Tk 10 and Tk 20
designed to characterize the probable upper-bound  on  per person per month  - or between 2.5 percent and 5
real-world outcomes.  percent of rural mean consumption.
A key constraint  on such schemes is that targeting is  This is under ideal circumstances, putting aside the
done on the basis of landholding class alone. Ignoring  constraints mentioned, and with no consideration for
productivity differentials, the  relevant indicator in  administrative costs. Real-world circumstances will entail
making transfers  is a suitably defined poverty measure  even less impact on poverty. One must hope, for the sake
for each landholding class.  of Bangladesh's poor, that targeting the land-poor  with
The more general formulation  Ravallion and Sen offer  such redistribution  is not all that  is done to attack rural
calls for two indicators: the marginal proauctivity of  poverty.
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References  25I  Introduction
Landholding  class has been a widely  advocated  indicator  for targeting  transfers aimed at
reducing rural poverty  in circumstances  in which living standards cannot be obser.ed directly without
incurring  prohibitive  administrative  costs.  Examples  range from land-reform  to cash or food hand-
outs to the landless.
What are the key questions  to address in evaluating  such proposals? A number of
observations  can be made:
i) Leakage  to the non-poor, and imperfect  coverage of the poor, are surely inevitable  in such
a policy; not all of the rural poor in a country such as Bangladesh  are landless,  and there are poor
amongst  those with ample land.  Lack of land and poverty are not perfectly  correlated. This fact will
dampen the poverty impact. The extent to which it does so will depend in part on how fine is the
partition of landholding  classes; policies found in practice typically identify  only a few classes
("landless", "medium", "large") and so impL.fect  targeting is to be expected.
ii)  There will surely be behavioral  responses  to land-based  redistribution;  households  with
larger holdings will simply  sell, or hide, their holdings if the transfers demanded  are large enough.
These incentive  constraints  will almost certainly  reduce the gains to the poor from such policies.
iii) The political  process may also be used by those with large landholdings,  or their
representatives,  to counteract  such policies, such as by compensatory  changes  in other public spending
or taxes, or simply  by "bending  the rules" in the policy's implementation. It is difficult to predict
such responses,  as they will be highly contingent  on the balance of power in quite particular
circumstances. However, the most likely presumption  is that these political-economy  constraints  will
- if anything - reduce the impacts on poverty of land-based redistribution.
iv)  While all three of the above considerations  will diminish likely gains to the poor, other
factors can be identified  which may actually  enhance them. It has been argued by supporters of such
policies that transfers from the land-rich to the land-poor  will have positive  productivity  effects. The
main evidence  cited for this is the claim that land productivity  (output per acre) declines with farm
1size.'  Pointing  to evidence  of higher productivity  on small farms, it has often been argued that land-
based redistributions  (for example,  directly transferring  land from the land-rich to the land-poor)  can
yield sizable pro-goor productivity  effects (see, for example, Dorner, 1972).
The last point is contentious. The transfers (even if made in the forn of land) may not be
used as land, but sold for other purposes;  the farm-size  productivity  relationship  may then be a
misleading  guide to the productivity  effects, if any.  But even aside from this problem, it has been
argued that this relationsh-p  may actually be spurious, reflecting  differences  in soil quality (Sen,
1975; Bhalla  and Roy, 1988); for example,  in the inter-generational  process of land fragmentation,
poorer quality land may be handed  down in larger holdings  so that households  can make an adequate
living from that land.  Nonetheless,  there are other explanations  for the relationship  which are
consistent with the claim that redistribution  will have positive  productivity  effects, based on the
claimed existence  of rural market failures, particularly concerning  farm inputs; credit is rationed, and
family labor (for both farm work and the supervision  of hired labor) is not a traded commodity,  so
that its opportunity  cost may be well below the wage rate for hired labor, as is generally presumed  to
be the case. 2 Only for the large farms do these constraints  not bite.  However, for medium and
small farmers, there will be potential  gains from using the transfer  to help relax the constraints  arising
from the missing or imperfect  input markets. More land could be acquired, or more spent on
irrigation and modem seed varieties  (which wo:'ld otherwise  require access to credit), thus bringing
input proportions closer to their efficient  levels.  In our view, these argunents are not yet to a point
of being sufficiently  well resolved  empirically  to confidently  inform policy, but they have certainly
had influence  in the past.
I  Berry and Cline (1979) survey the evidence  for a number of countries, and conclude that there
is support for the view that output per acre decreases with size of farm.  A qualified, but broadly
supportive. view is found in the survey by Binswanger  et al. (1993).  Evidence  for Bangladesh  can be
found in Hossain  (1977, 1988), Mandal  (1980) and Boyce (1987).
2  This has been  a common  explanation  for the farmn  size-productivity  relationship;  see, for example,
Sen (1975), Berry and Cline (1979)  and Feder (1985).
2In previous work, Ravallion  (1989) estimated  the impact  of land-based  targeting in Bangladesh
without allowing  for possible productivity  effects; depending  on the position  one takes on this
contentious  issue, one may consider  this omission  to be either inconsequential  or a majQr  limitation.
(We have heard both views.)  The fact that the earlier study found only seemningly  modest net gains to
the poor from land-based  targeting  (largely reflecting  the importance  ot the first point above)  has been
questioned  by readers who believe  that productivity  effects are likely to be important. However, the
data available at the time of Ravallion's  study had a limitation,  namnely  that the survey data on land-
holding had been tabulated  against  household  income, unadjusted  for household  size (and the primary
household level data were not publicly  available). This is likely to over-estimate  the gain to the poor
from land-based  targeting.
It is thus of interest to go further into quantifying  the impact  on poverty  of this type of policy.
Since many of the determinants  of that impact are not feasible to measure, we will follow Ravallion
(1989) in deliberately  assuming  ideal conditions  for some of the factors described  above, though
(unlike the earlier study) including  productivity  effects. We deliberately  make the (probably
unrealistic)  assumptions  that there are no adverse incentive  effects, no mitigating  political-economy
constraints, and that there are positive productivity  effects, consistent  with the observed empirical
relationship  between land-size  and land productivity. The constraints  we do incorporate  are
fundamental  to sucb a policy, namely  public-budgetary  constraints  and the informational  constraint
that poverty is not directly observed, and an imperfect  indicator  is used instead. This experiment
should be able to approximate  well the best outcome  one could reasonably  expect from this type of
policy.
It is important  to our task that we can calculate  the optimal  allocation  of land-contingent
transfers for any given budget under these idealized  conditions; "optimal"  in the sense that no other
allocation would  have a greater impact  on a suitable measure of aggregate  poverty. This allocation  is
of interest not because  one believes it is implementable,  but rather because  it allows one to measure
the potential impact  on poverty of this policy instrument. As there are real-world  constraints  on anti-
3poverty  policies which are not included in our ch-racterization  of the optimat  allocation, one can think
of our opi.num as "unconstrained". The role of the unconstrained  optimum here is to provide a
benclhnark  by which this class of policies can be judged; it tells us what the best is that we can
reasonably  expect.  It is thus important  that the benchmark  is measured well, and plainly the existence
of productivity  effects could matter to the outcome.
The following  section characterizes  optimal unconstrained  land-contingent  targeting for
poverty reduction, with and without  productivity  effects, and shows how the optimal  solution can be
calculated. This is followed  in section 3 by a description  of our data, and results of our estimate  of
the poverty profile by landholding  class for Bangladesh  in 1988/89. Section  4 presents our simulation
results, which are discussed further in section 5.  Our conclusions  are then summarized  in section 6.
2  Optimal  Targeting  with Productivity  Effects
For the reasons  discussed above, our aim is to (if anything)  over-estimate  the productivity
effects of land-based  redistribution;  we want to quantify an "upper-bound"  to the effects. To do so
we assume that the empirical land-size productivity  relationship  is not spurious (due to omitted  land-
quality differences).  Since land-quality  differences  must presumably  play at least some role, this
assumption  will probably lead us to overestimate  the real productivity  effects.
The commodity  form in which land-based  transfers are received  and (more importantly)  used
by recipients  will probably also matter. For the sake of the argument, let us agree that transfers used
to buy land will raise output of the land-poor  more than the output loss to the land-rich.  That does
not imply that transfers consumed  as (say) food, or used to invest  in non-farm  enterprises, will also
have such differential  productivity  effects.'  The farm size-productivity  relationship  may be a fair
3  For example, Hossain (1984) found that most of the non-farm petty self-employment  projects
routinely financed by the Grameen Bankl  and similar schemes  targeted to the landless earned very low
(even negative)  rates of return. However, the valuation  of the opportunity  cost of the labor inputs in such
calculations  has often beer, based on agricultural  wages, which could easily over-estimate  that cost; for
evidence in a similar setting see Datt and Ravallion  (1992).
4guide to the productivity  effects when land is transferred, with restrictions  on re-sale, or transfers of
cash (say) are used to buy land, but not otherwise. Granted, there are other arguments that have been
made to the effect that redistribution  can have positive output effects (such as efficiency-wage  models)
but they are not intrinsic to the case for land-based  targeting. 4 Again we probably  err on the side of
over-estimating  the gains to the poor by assuming  that land-based  transfers (in whatever form) to the
land poor raise income  by the same amount  as a direct increment  to land owned, consistent  with
current output per acre.
We thus study the following  model. A transfer in amount x,  (i=l,..,m)  to each member of
the i'th landholding  class (the transfer may be positive or negative)  generates an income gain to the
recipient of k*x, for some non-negative  number k,, which we term the "productivity  weight." 5 The
values of k; (i=l,..,m)  will be above  one for the small farmers, and one for the large farmers. With
adequate  farm-household  data, one could  estimate  the productivity  weights  econometrically;  in the
most elementary  formulation  this would entail regressing income or consumption  on transfers
received, and relevant  exogenous  variables (such as fixed factors in production). We do not have
access to such data.  However, one important  clue to likely differences  in the potential productivity  of
transfers is readily available, namely outputs per acre of land. We will assume that each k, is
directly proportional  to the mean output per acre of land in that landholding  class.  Assuming  that the
value of k, does not fall below unity for the land-rich  (since recipients  retain the option of taking the
transfer as cash, losing none of it through any wasteful  investments),  and that output per acre declines
monotonically  with the size of the holding, it follows that the productivity  weights can be derived as
4  For a survey of the arguments  see Lipton and Ravallion  (1993, section 5.1).
S  Generally the value of Ic 1 will be a function  of x,.  Provided that one knows the parametric form
of that function, and it is monotonic  (presumably  decreasing),  then the methodology  we outline here can
allow this generalization. However, in the empirical  work we shall treat each kI,  as independent  of x;, and
(to simplify the exposition)  we will also do so here.
5the ratios of output per acre for each landholding  class normalized  by the output per acre of the
largest landholding  class.  That is the method  we use of assigning the productivity  weights.
In studying the impact of productivity  gains on an optimal  unconstrained  anti-poverty  scheme,
we shall follow recent literature in assuming  that the policy objective is to have the greatest impact  on
a distribution-sensitive  measure of aggregate  poverty, for a given budgetary  allocation  to this task (for
surveys  of this literature see Besley  and Kanbur, 1993, and Lipton and Ravallion, 1994). Kanbur
(1987) has studied this problem at a theoretical  level, and derived some relatively simple rules for
targeting, based on the information  available  in a poverty profile.  Ravallion  and Chao (1989) have
proposed an algorithm  for solving for the optimal  allocation  in this class of problems, and Ravallion
(1989) has implemented  the method in simulating  the effects on poverty of various land-contingent
poverty alleviation  schemes for Bangladesh  without  productivity  effects. Our task here is to
reformulate  this problem in a tractable way which can permit simulations  of the poverty impacts of
targeting, when there are effects on the productivity  of the target groups.
We shall consider  three aggregate  poverty measures  in this paper, all of whici; are members
of the class of measures  proposed by Foster, Greer and Thorbecke (1984). They are:
i) The head-count  index H: the proportion  of the population  living in households  with
mean consumption  below the poverty line;
ii) The povertv-gap  index PG: the population's mean aggregate  shortfall below thc
pover:y line (counting  the non-poor  as having zero shortfall), expressed as a
proportion  of the poverty line; and
iii) The squared povertv gap index  P2: as for PG except that proportionate  shortfalls
relative to the poverty line are weighted  by those shortfalls  in forming the aggregate
measure.
The head-count index is interpretable  as a measure of the prevalence  of poverty, the poverty-gap
index as a measure of the depth of poverty, while the P2 reflects the severity of poverty, in that it is
also sensitive to the extent of the disparities  amongst  the poor.  (For a non-technical  exposition  of the
6properties of these measures, and a more detailed  discussion  of the pros and cons of the approach to
poverty measurement  used here see Ravallion,  1993a). Clearly, H and PG are easier to interpret than
P2, and have been more popular for this reason.  However, unlike H or PG, P2 satisfies  the principal
axioms of poverty measurement,  as outlined in (for example)  Foster (1984).  We shall use P2 as the
objective function  in characterizing  an optimal  anti-poverty  policy.
The method used in simulating  the effects  of optimal  unconstrained  land-contingent  targeting
with productivity  effects is as follows. A budgetary  allocation  for poverty  alleviation  across m land-
holding classes, given by the vector a=(xi,...,xm),  is considered  to be optimal relative to poverty line
z and fixed budget i  when it minimizes  aggregate  poverty, as measured  by P2,  which we can write
as the following  function  of x:
P2 M  =  n  fzktx  [1-  (y+k1X,)/Z 2dFjy  (1)
where n, is the proportion of the total population  in landholding  class i and F, is the cumulative
distribution function  of living standards  in landholding  class i.  The solution is only constrained  to
satisfy the additively  absorbed budget constraint:
NI
v  nx  =  (2)
This problem will have a unique interior solution  denoted a*  = (x;,..,xn) satisfying  the condition that
the productivity-weighted  post-transfer  poverty  deficit given by
kjf  - A1x 1[ 1 - (y  +kkx)/zl  dF (y)  (3)
is equalized  across all landholding  classes.  (Notice  that the formulation  in Ravallion, 1989, is now
obtained as the special case in which k,  1 for all i,  thus requiring that poverty  gaps are equalized
7at the optimum.) This problem cannot be solved analytically,  so we use a numerical  method
(summarized  in the Appendix).
It can be readily verified that, when comparing  optimal  allocations,  a higher value of k, for
any i will be associated  with a lower value of all three poverty  measures in group i.  However, the
comparative  static effect of a change in k, on the optimal x, is ambiguous,  and will depenid  on data-
specific properties  of the distribution  functions  (and in no readily interpretable  way).  Note also that
the poverty profile by landholding  class can be altered q.uite  radically by the pattern of optimal land-
based transfers.  In particular, there is nothing in theory to preclude the possibility  that there will be a
rank reversal once the optimal  policy is implemented;  there could be less poverty among  the land-
poor than the land-rich post-reform. Such a rank reversal was found in Ravallion  (1989), and has
been observed in other formulations  of optimal  policy problems. (See, for example, Atkinson  and
Stiglitz's, 1980, Lecture 13, discussion  of the Mirrlees optimal  tax problem.) In the present context,
the rank reversal in the relationship  between P 2 and landholding  class at the optimum occurs whenever
the productivity-weighted  poverty-gap  index falls sufficiently  rapidly with landholding  class. 6
Our interest here is not so much in what the optimal  unconstrained  allocation will look like,
but in how much impact it will have on poverty, relative to some alternative  policy.  The natural
benchmark  is the outcome under a uniform "un-targeted"  allocation  of the same budget, whereby
everyone receives  the same amount, whatever  their landholding  class.  A natural money metric of the
gains from optimal  targeting is the eguivalent  gain from targeting  (Ravallion  and Chao, 1989), which
is the number 'i  defined implicitly  by
6  This follows  from the fact that the productivity  weighted  PG is uiirectly  proportional  to minus one
times the derivative  of P2 with respect  to x.  Thus (.reating  P2 as a differentiable  function  of landholding)
the absolute  value of the slope of PG with respect to landholding  indicates  the sign and size of the second
cross-partial derivative of P2 with respect to land and x, which determines (in part) the sign of the
derivative of P 2 (at the optimum)  with respect to landholding.
8=  P2(x+rt,..,x41l)  (4)
The value of 'i  will be a strictly decreasing  function  of the optimal  post-transfer  value of P2.
3  Rural Poverty by Landholding  Class in Bangladesh
The household  surveys  done at regular intervals by the Baneladesh  Bureau  of Statistics (BBS)
have often asked how much land each household  owns, though the primary data tapes are not publiciy
available, ^5.d  the results have not been published  in any form since those from the 1978/79  survey,
as used by Ravallion  (1989).  We asked BBS  to produce tabulations  of consumption  by landholding
class from the 1988/89  surpiy, which they kindly  did, and these have subsequently  been published  by
BBS  (1991).  They are thKe  data used in this study.  These new data also rank households  by a better
indicator  of living standards, namely consumption  expenditure  per person, rather than total household
expenditure,  as in BBS's tabulations  of the 1978/79  survey.
Before  we discuss  the potential  poverty alleviation  benefits  of land-contingent  transfers, some
remarks on the pre-transfer poverty  profile in rural Bangladesh  are in order.  The 1988-89  household
expenditure  survey (HES) provides information  on the distribution  of household  consumption
expenditures  for six landholding  classes, namely, landless  (0.0-0.04 acres), near landless  (0.05-0.49),
marginal (0.50-1.49), small (1.50-2.49) medium (2.50-7.49) and large (7.50 acres and above).
The poverty line was determined  by costing  a normative  minimum  consumption  bundle for the
population, yielding a per capita daily intake of 2,112 calories; see Muqtada  (1986). The cost of
basic non-food nect;ssities  was then added; this was estimated  to equal 35 percent of the cost of the
normative  minimum  diet.  The prices used for costing the minimum  diet were derived from the HES
data on the consumption  of goods in quantities  and values. (See Hossain  and Sen, 1992, on the
method of costing  the minimum  diet using the implicit HES prices.) This gave a poverty line of Tk
9370 per person per month in 1988/89  prices.'  Because  of the non-availability  of household  level
data, no allowance  has been made for household  composition  effects or household  specific  prices.
Table I gives the estimated  poverty  profile by landholding  class.  The normalized  poverty
deficit PG ueclines with increases  in landholding. (The negative  correlation  between land and poverty
in the context of Bangladesh  has been observed by earlier works as well; see Ravallion  1989, and
Hossain  and Sen 1992). This implies that the additively  absorbed budgetary  allocations  which
minimize P 2 (without  productivity  effects) tend to also decline  with landholding  (noting  that the
poverty deficit is the relevant first-order  indicator  for this objective; see Kanbur, 1987). The precise
allocations  that would be required, and the quantitative  gains from targeting, will depend on the
nature of the constraints  on the revenue side of the policy problem, as well as the land-contingent
consumption  distributions  (Ravallion, 1989). The budgetary  rule for allocating  transfers must be
modified if there are differential productivity  effects, as discussed in more detail in section 2.  The
solution will then depend  on the valuation  of the productivity  gains which may accompany  transfers.
4  Simulation  of the Optimal  Unconstrained  Policy
The necessary  data for implementing  the approach  described in section  2 are: i) distributions
of the living standards indicator  by landholding  class (selected  values of F, for all i , and the
corresponding  means); ii) the budget  available, and iii) the set of values  of the productivity  weights k;
for all i.  The first set of data are derived from the same source as Table 1.  The second is
hypothetical, and discussed  below.  The third are derived from Hossain's (1988) estimates  of rice
yields per acre for various farm sizes as reproduced  in Table 2a.  These are based on annual yie!ds of
7  It may be noted that the poverty line thus derived by costing a fixed bundle with implicit HES
prices is found to be virtually identical  to the poverty line reported by Bangladesh  Bureau  of Statistics
(1991) which applied a graph fitting method to the empirical food energy-consumption  expenditure
relationship.
10the principal  crop, rice (thus allowing  for differences  ini  crop ing intensity  as well as yields for a
given crop).
One problem is that Hossain's (1988) results do .-. ot provide  disaggregated  data for the near-
landless  and marginal landholding  classes; Hossain's results combine  all landholdings  under 2.5 acres
together (Table 2a).  For lack of hetter data, landless,  near landless,  marginal and small landholding
classes are assumed to display the same land-productivity  levels. We will, however, test the
sensitivity  of our results to that assumption  using alternative  "low-case"  and "high-case"  productivity
weights. The productivity  weights we have used are summarized  in Table 2b.  To test sensitivity,  we
consider three possibilities  for the landless  and functionally  landless  groups: the base-case,  which is
the weight implied  by the point estimate of yield per acre from Table 2a, the "low-case",  which
assumes  tha' there are no productivity  gains for this group, and the "high-case",  which is set at one
standard  error above the point estimate of yield per acre for small farms, from Table 2a.
As is evident from Hossain's results, the inverse relationship  between farm size and land
productivity  cuts across various factors; it holds irrespective  of the rice varieties  grown, and the stage
of diffusion  of the new modern variety (MV) technology  (Table 2a).  The difference in productivity
between the small and large farmers is less pronounced  (though  the difference is statistically
significant)  for the technologically  developed  villages  than for technologically  underdeveloped  ones,
and it is most pronounced  for adopters  of MV's in technologically  underdeveloped  villages. 8 In the
more technologically  developed villages, the average productivity  for small farmers is found to be
about one-fifth  higher than for large farmers. The matched figure with respect to modern  variety rice
cultivation  in early stages of adoption  (i.e., in technologically  underdeveloped  villages) is a good deal
higher (about 44 percent). The land productivity  differential  between small and large farmers appears
to increase  considerably  during early stages of adopticn, as oLie  switches from the production  of local
varieties  of rice to modern varieties. By contrast, the relative land productivity  between  small and
8  Hossain  (1988)  classified  the villages  according  to the proportion  of area under modern  varieties.
A 20 percent irrigated  area was used as the cut-off  mark for classifying  the villages into two groups.
11large farmers  does not show any perceptible  change  as one moves from traditional  to new technology
in the developed  villages.  However,  beyond these observations,  further analysis of the determinants
of the relationship  between farm size and land productivity  requires  a more detailed investigation,  and
as such falls beyond the scope of this paper.
For our analysis, we have taken this inverse relationship  as an empirically  established  fact for
Bangladesh  agriculture, and considered  it as the point of departure in our simulations  of optimal
unconstrained  land-contingent  transfers for reducing  rural poverty.
Table 3 gives our simulations  of optimal  land-contingent  redistributions. These are pure land-
based redistributions,  in that aggregate  revenue is zero, and the policy-makers  have complete  control
over the distribution  of income between landholding  classes. The unrestricted  taxing power of the
government  assumed in this near-totalitarian  scenario is clearly  politically  unrealistic, uut it represents
a natural benchmark  for assessing  the potential  for poverty  alleviation  by the redistribution  of existing
aggregate income. 9 It is the best that could be done, knowing  only landholding  class.  Note also that
the government  in all the scenarios  presented in Table 3 does not have information  as to who has
which consumnptions  within each landholding  class, and is thus restricted to the use of an irnperfect
targeting  variable (such as landownership  category in our case). Hence, the tax burden may be found
to be high for some consumption-poor  households  in the land-rich  subgroups, and vice-versa. This is
an intrinsic problem in any indicator  targeting  scheme.
Scenario I in Table 3 ignores the productivity  effects, that is, the result is obtained by setting
k1=  I for all i.  This is the case considered  by Ravallion  (1989) using the 1978/79  data.  We then
present results for four other cases, corresponding  to the "base-case"  productivity  weights in Table
2b.  In all cases, there is an extra impact  on aggregate  poverty associated  with land-based
redistribution,  though that is to be expected. More interesting  is the magnitude  of the extra impact.
9  Though such schemes  are widely  thought  to be politically  unrealistic,  they have been for decades
a major point of departure in the agrarian programs of many left-leaning  political parties and groups,
advocating  massive  land-based  redistributive  measures  in the countryside  for poverty alleviation.
12Consider the _ase of technologically  underdeveloped  areas (scenarios  2 and 3), which are typical of
the agrarian si.uation  of Bangladesh. The impact  of land-contingent  transfers with productivity  effects
brings down the P2 measure to 3.3% under local variety, from 3.5 % recorded in the case of transfers
without  productivity  effects (scenario  2).  The equivalent  gain from targeting  rises from Tk 11
without  productivity  effects (2.5  % of mean rural consumption)  to Tk 14 with productivity  effects
under the base-case. The extent of poverty reduction  is slightly higher whe.n  such land-contingent
transfers are made in villages which have adopted the MV's.  The P 2 measure in this case declines
further down to 3.3% (scenario 3).
Notice that the introduction  of the productivity  effects leads to lower transfers to the landless
and near landless, though (given  the productivity  effects of those transfers) the impact  on the sub-
group poverty indices is greater than in scenario 1.  It may also be noted that, with the productivity
effects, the net tax burden on richer landholding  classes actually  rises.  This is because, with the
introduction  of the productivitv  effects, the marginal  farmers (a large group; see Table 1) emerge as
beneficiaries  under optimal targeting. The increased  tax burden on the largest landholding  group is
needed to release additional  internally-generated  resources to finance those transfers.
The impact  on poverty of optimal land-contingent  transfers with productivity  effects is lower
in technologically  developed  areas than in underdeveloped  areas.  This tendency cuts across the local
and modern  varieties. This appears  to be because  in later stages of adoption, the productivity  gap
across farm-sizes  narrows considerably;  larger farms use more capital-intensive  technology,  thereby
eroding some of the initial advantages  which the smaller farms have had in early stages of adoption
when the technology  is still quite labor-intensive. Still, even in the developed  areas, the P2 measure
is lower when productivity  effects are included than is the case without  them (ranging  from 3.36 to
3.42%, as compared to 3.49%).  Also note that, compared  to the scenario  for underdeveloped  areas,
the incidence  of tax burden on medium  and large landholdings  classes is lower in the scenario for
developed  areas, but it stipulates  some increases  in the net tax burden on the small landholding  class,
and a net reduction .n budgetary  allocation  to marginal farms.
13So far we have assumed that the productivity  weights for the lower landholding  classes are
considerably  higher than those for the richer landholding  groups, as in Table 2b.  What happens if
this assumption  does not hold, at least for the two lowest landholding  classes? It has been argued, for
example, that the inverse relationship  between  farm size and productivity  breaks down at very low
land size.  Table 4a considers the outcome  of a modified "low-case"  scenario. The underlying
productivity  weights differ from those relating  to Table 3 in only aspect: the land-productivity  levels
in the landless  and near landless groups remain restricted  to the level attained  by the largest
landholding  group (Table 2b).  The inverse  relationship  between land-size  and productivity  holds only
in the restricted range (i.e. only the marginal, small and medium farmers have higher land-
productivity  than the largest landholding  group).  As expected,  the impact  on poverty of optimal
unconstrained  targeting is now diminished,  so much so that the positive extra impact  of land-
contingent  transfers with productivity  effects no longer  holds true.  The case for believing  that
productivity  effects will enhance the potential  impact  on poverty of this type of policy thus hinges
quite critically  on there being productivity  gains amongst  the landless  and near landless.
For completeness,  Table 4b considers an alternative  "high-case"  scenario, in which we have
assumed markedly higher productivity  weights for the landless  and near landless  groups (Table 2b).
We see a more pronounced  impact  on aggregate  poverty though land-based  redistribution;  depending
on the conditions  of technology, the P 2 index  now falls to 3.0-3.3, and the equivalent  gain from
targeting rises to Tk 14-20, representing  3.3-4.6% of mean rural consumption. Though the absolute
impact  on poverty of the higher productivity  weights for landless  and near landless  households  varies
a good deal over initial conditions, the elasticity  of that impact (that is, the proportionate  change in P2
divided by the proportionate  change in k, and k2) is remarkably  constant, varying from -0.32 to -0.33
over the range of stages in technological  development. Thus we suspect that this elasticity will give
readers a good indication  of the likely impacts  of higher or lower productivity  for the landless  on the
aggregate  poverty impact of land-based  redistribution.
14Table 5 gives further results for a series of specific policy simulations  focusing  on different
scenarios relating to the revenue side of the policy problem.  Part of our motivation  here is also to see
whether or not the conclusions  of the earlier study (Ravallion, 1989) are robust to the use of this
improved data set, so we will closely follow that study.  To assure comparability  we will also ignore
the productivity  weights  (that is, set them all to unity), though this matters little to our main
conclusions.
Scheme 1 in Table 5 reproduces  the result already reported (Table 3), simulating  the effect of
unconstrained  redistributions  across landholding  classes.  Scheme  2 is also a poverty  minimizing
revenue-neutral  redistribution  of the existing aggregate  income. However, compared  to the
unrestricted  redistributive  powers of the government  assumed in scheme 1, this scheme is sensitive  to
'political economy' constraints. It assumes  that the government's redistributive  powers are
constrained  to preclude tax burdens  exceeding  Tk 20 per person per month (which represents about 5
percent of average per capita rural income  during 1988/89). Scheme 3 is another variant of scheme  2
with the difference that it assumes  that the government  can impose  a tax burden up to Tk 40 per
person per month (amounting  to nearly 10 percent of average rural income in 1988/89). Schemie4 is
another variation on this theme; in this case the tax burden is not allowed  to exceed Tk 80 per person
per month. The choice of constraints  in schemes  2, 3 and 4 is, of course, arbitrary, but they give an
indication  of how sensitive  the results of scheme 1 may be to political economy  constraints  on the
government's power to tax.
In contrast, the scenario represented  in scheme  5 rests on the assumption  that the government
does not have the power to tax rural landholders. An example  would be when the government  is
exclusively  dependent  on the availability  of foreign aid for financing  the rural poverty alleviation
programs.'°  Note that only positive land-contingent  transfers from this budget are now possible.
'°  Strictly speaking, the solution  under scheme 5 may stipulate  taxing the urban sector to finance
the rural poverty alleviation  program. However, in many developing  countries, the 'political economy'
constraints  on the government's power to tax the more articulate and powerful urban sector would be
even less than compared  to imposing  a tax burden on rural landholders.
15The calculations  for scheme  S are carried out for the minimum  budget necessary  to eliminate  poverty
with complete information  on household  living standards. This would require Tk 46 per month per
person in rural areas (being the product of aggregate  poverty gap PG and the poverty line z).  Once
the size of the aggregate  minimum  budget for poverty eradication  is determined,  optimal transfers
across various landownership  groups are estimated  and the level of post-transfer  poverty is assessed.
Examples of such positive land-contingent  transfers may be diverse in nature.  These include the
promotion  of various external aid-sponsored  self- and wage- employment  programs for rural areas that
use land-contingent  targeting.
Finally, scheme 6 in Table 5 focusses  on the potential  for poverty reduction from an un-
targeted program underwritten by foreign aid.  If the policy-makers  do not possess any information  to
permit targeting, they would simply  have to give the mean budget to all rural households. Of course,
in reality the policy-makers  have a certain notion  as to who constitute  the poor and who do not, but
the case in point emerges as a natural benchmark  against which the gain from a targeted allocation  of
aid resources can be measured.
5 Discussion
A number  of points are notable  about the results presented in Tables 3-5.  First, the allocation
needed to equalize  the post-transfer  poverty  deficit - whether  productivity  weighted  or not - across
landholding  classes (and hence minimize  the aggregate  value of P 2 for a given budget) is negatively
correlated with landholding. This tendency cuts across the various schemes where transfers are
revenue-neutral. Note that in Table 1, the subgroup  value of P2 prior to the transfer is higher for the
lower end of the landholding  classes; indeed, all three poverty measures  decrease with increases  in the
size of the landholding. This ranking is almost totally reversed under the impact  of the revenue-
neutral poverty alleviation  scheme  with unrestricted  tax powers across landholding  classes in Table 3.
The pattern of poverty-minimizing  transfers under the revenue-neutral  unrestricted  tax regime leaves
the lowest landholding  class with the lowest poverty level rather than the highest.  As noted in section
162, this is theoretically  possible, and was also observed by Ravallion  (1989). This virtually  complete
reversal of the rank correlation  between  poverty and landholding  does not hold for any of the schemes
with hypothetically  restricted tax powers (Table 5, schemes  2-4).  Neither does it hold in the case of
positive land-contingent  transfers, underwritten  by foreign aid (Table 5, schemes  5 and 6).  As
evident in schemes  2 through 6 in Table 5, post-transfer  poverty of lower landholding  classes
(although less than the pre-transfer level) is still higher than for the land-rich group.
Notice, however, that the monotonically  increasing  relationship  between  average landholding
size and average consumption  is preserved under the poverty minimizing  allocations;  this can be
verified by adding the optimal  allocations  from Table 5 to the mean incomes  in Table 1.
The optimal  allocation is targeted sharply toward landless  and functionally  landless
households. This property holds quite generally  (Tables 3-5).  It cuts across the various scenarios,
regardless  of whether or not one imposes revenue-neutrality. The cut-off  point betwee;.  donors and
recipients is at a landholding  size of 0.49 acres for all revenue-neutral  transfer schemes. For aid-
sponsored  poverty alleviation  programs, however, the cut-off  point shifts to 1.5 acres, implying  that
marginal  farmers also merit strong consideration  in aid-financed  land-contingent  transfer programs."
Thus, in so far as revenue-neutral  land-based  redistribution  for Bangladesh  is concerned under
these idealized conditions,  the policy should be targeted solely at households  with less than one half
an acre of land for maximum  impact  on poverty. These groups should receive  the entire transfer
amount obtainable  under both unrestricted  and restricted  tax power based policy regimes. But the
incidence  of transfer-burden  among the land-donor  classes under scheme 1 is not uniformly
distributed. Incidence  of burden is only less than 1 percent of mean consumption  for the marginal
landholding  class between 0.5 and 1.49 acres, while it increases  to 8 percent of mean consumption  for
"  It may be recalled that the main focus of most poverty alleviation  programs under NGO and
governmental  arrangements  is on landless  and functionally  landless households. While this is quite in
line with the poverty-minimizing  allocation  pattern as depicted  by our results, the targeting emphasis  has
been somewhat  lopsided. The necessity  for increased  focus on the marginal  landholding  class can hardly
be overemphasized.  Thus, according to scheme 5 (Table 5), there is clearly a case for advocating
positive transfers for marginal  landholding  classes under aided poverty alleviation  programs.
17the small landholders  (between 1.49 and 2.49 acres). The highest incidence  of burden is recorded for
the largest landholding  group followed  by the medium landholding  group, the matched  figures being
I  1 and 9 percent, respectively." 2 The results thus confirm the desirability  of the broad pattern of
redistribution  pursued by advocates  of land-based  targeting.
However, this does not imply that targeting  in favor of the landless  or near landless will
significantly  reduce rural poverty. The results only show that, in so far as policy-makers  decide to go
for a radical land-based  redistribution  program, the targeting of benefits should be aimed solely at
landless  and functionally  landless households  in order to achieve the maximum  poverty-alleviating
impact  of such a program. As regards the issue of the potential impact  of such a land-based
redistribution  on aggregate rural poverty, there are hardly grounds for great optimism. With or
without  productivity  effects, the P, index would be reduced to about 3.5, relative to its pre-transfer
level of about 4.5.  The extent of this reduction  is, however, difficult  to interpret. Ignoring
productivity  effects, the mean poverty gap falls from Tk 46 to Tk 39 and the head-count  index drops
from 48 % to 44  %.  Including  productivity  effects consistent  with Table 2a, the poverty gap falls to
Tk 37, while the head-count  index falls to 45 % (for modem varieties in technologically
underdeveloped  areas; the declines are lower for other cases).
A more revealing measure is the equivalent  gain from targeting  (defined implicitly  by
equation 4).  This is estimated at Tk 11 per person per month without  productivity  effects and Tk 13-
15 with them (Table 3).  The optimal  (poverty  minimizing)  tax/transfer  policy based on land-based
targeting  would achieve a level of poverty reduction  equivalent  to that achievable  by giving this
amount to each household  irresDective  of its landholding. If one assumes  no productivity  effects then
the equivalent gain from targeting  with unrestricted  land-contingent  tax powers is thus only 2.5
percent of mean income for rural Bangladesh;  with productivity  effects, these figures rise to 2.8-3.4
12  It is of interest to note that Ravallion  (1989) found that the incidence arnong the donors in
1978/79 to be in the high order of over 20% of mean income for all landholding  over 2.5 acres.  The
1988/89 data show that the average incidence  of transfer (tax) burden under such a radical land-based
redistribution  program would be around 10 percent for all landholding  classes over 1.5 acres.
18(depending  on the initial conditions). It should be emphasized  again that these are the maximum
impacts  from land-contingent  targeting  across these six landholding  classes; incentive  and political-
economy  constraints will almost certainly further reduce the impact  on poverty.
These figures are lower than the previous estimates  (Ravallion, 1989). The earlier paper
using the 1978/79  data found the equivalent  gain from targeting  under unrestricted  land-based  tax
powers to be in the order of 10 percent of the mean rural income and about 20 percent of the mean
poverty deficit of the poor.  The potential  impact of land-contingent  targeting  may have declined  over
time, though the differences in data (particularly  the fact that the 1988/89  distributions  have been
normalized  by household  size,,  but also that a larger samnle size had permitted  a finer poverty profile
in the earlier study) appear to have played a large part.
Schemes  2 and 3 in Table 5 show that the gain from optimal targeting  can be considerably
less when the government's tax powers are further restricted. For schieme  2, the equivalent  gain from
targeting  is reduced by about 46 percent.  As one would expect, the imnpact  on aggregate  poverty
obtainable  by optimal  targeting under restricted  tax powers (although lower than the pre-transfer
poverty level) is lower than with unrestricted  land-based  tax powers.
The poverty reduction  possibilities  increase considerably  when revenue for the policy is
available from external sources. Scheme 5 in Table 5 illustrates  this variant.  The results again
emphasize  targeting  toward landless  and functionally  landless  households  (together they account for 85
percent of the total amount transferred). But, as noted above, households  belonging  to the marginal-
landholding  group are also recipients  under this scheme: about 15 percent of total transfers go to
them.  The optimal  allocation  by landholding  class tapers off fairly rapidly as the size of landholding
increases, reaching zero at about 1.5 acres.  The need for focusing  poverty reduction  efforts on
marginal  farmers along with the landless  and near landless  is thus strongly emphasized  by the results
for scheme 5.
The aggregate  value of P2 is drastically  reduced  under scheme 5, as compared to the pre-
transfer situation, as well as to other scenarios  discussed  earlier.  P 2 declines to 1.55% under scheme
195 from 4.45 % recorded for the pre-transfer situation. The lowest landholding  class experiences  the
largest reduction in poverty, followed  closely by the functionally  landless  and marginal farners
groups.  However, while a general pattern of decline in poverty  compared to the pre-transfer situation
is noted, the situation of the small farmer does not improve  under scheme 5.
For scheme 5, the equivalent  gain from targeting is estimated  to be Tk 10, which represents
nearly 22 percent of the poverty alleviation  budget. Note that the equivalent  gain from targeting
under an unrestricted  tax power regime is also assessed  to be of a similar order (see Table 5).  Under
situations  where governments  have nio  tax powers due to severe political economic  constraints, the
mean external budget of Tk 46 turns out to be approximately  the amount necessary  to achieve the
same equivalent  gain as that attainable  without  an external  budget, built with unrestricted  powers (and
also for scheme 4) to tax by landholding  class.  The aggregate  poverty-minimizing  size of public
expenditure  under land-based  targeting,  as implied  by the mean external budget of Tk 46, is assessed
to be Tk 3638 million in 1988/89. This represents  about  4 percent of aggregate  public (current plus
development)  expenditure  or 36 percent of the annual  development  plan allocated for the agricultural
sector (including  livestock, forestry and fisheries)  in 1988/89.
So far, we have compared  scheme 5 with the pre-transfer  poverty  situation and found the
poverty reduction possibilities  to be considerable  if revenue for the policy is available externally. A
point of considerable  interest is to assess the size of incremental  poverty reduction associated  with the
optimal targeting  of an externally  available budget  relative to an un-targeted  transfer of that budget.
Un-targeted  transfers apply to a situation when policy-makers  have inadequate  information  to permit
even imperfect  targeting, and decide simply to give the mean budget  to all rural households. This is
an obvious bench-mark  for evaluating  the effects of any attempt at targeting. As evidenced  from the
results for scheme 6 in Table 5, the un-targeted  allocation  would reduce P2 to 1.89 compared  with
1.55 achieved  under the optimally  targeted  budgetary  allocation. This implies that even an un-
targeted allocation  of external aid can achieve  a sizeable  reduction in rural poverty in Bangladesh.
Even though a further gain is derived from optimal  (land-contingent)  targeting, the size of the
20incremental  gain is quite modest. This is because, even the un-targeted  allocation  will make (for the
given distribution  of income)  a significant  dent on poverty amongst  the poorest households.' 3
The desirability  of targeting  towards landless  and functionally  landless  households  :s borne out
by a wide range of alternative  budgets and poverty lines.  From Table 6, it may be seen that the
proportion  of the budget received  by the two lowest landholding  classes varies from 63% to 75 %, and
this budget proportion  tends to increase  for smaller budgets and higher poverty lines. It may be noted
that the equivalent  gain from optimal  targeting  as a proportion  of the budget also tends to increase the
lower the poverty lines (for a given budget)  and tends to decline  the larger the size of the mean
budget (for a given poverty line).
Why would unrestricted  redistribution  across landholding  classes not reduce aggregate  poverty
more significantly? The underlying reason is that landholding  - while providing  a good proxy for the
living standards of rural households  (as can be seen in all our simulations,  the target groups should be
the land-poor)  - remain-s  an imperfect  indicator. Poor households  in larger holding  classes would be
adversely affected by such programs, and there will be leakage  to non-poor  households  among land-
poor groups. As the burden of tax incidence  increases  disproportionately  in the larger landholding
classes, the living standards of households  in and around the poverty line within these categories also
decline.  As a result, the aggregate P 2 measure of poverty does not show a marked decline under the
revenue-neutral  schemes.
6  Conclusions
It is widely  believed that transfers targeted  to the rural land-poor  can be productive, in that
the final income gain to the poor exceeds  the initial transfer. The most widely  cited evidence to
'3  This, of course, assumes that external aid resources under the un-targeted allocation would
eventually reach the poor.  Given the widespread  leakages  in aid allocations,  this should not be readily
accepted.  Programs with explicit objectives  to target the land-poor  would probably  have less leakages
than the un-targeted  programs. If one takes  the likely incidence  of leakage  into consideration,  the poverty
minimizing  effects  of an un-targeted  allocation  would  be still lower than those attainable  under the optimal
targeting  of external aid.
21support this view is the negative  correlation  between  the output per acre of land and the size of
holding. There are, however, a number  of reasons to question that evidence;  it is unclear. for
example, how much the relationship  is really due to omitted  differences  in land quality.  There are
also a number of other factors which will constrain  the impact  on poverty from this type of policy,
notably incentive  constraints  (whereby  the "land-rich"  alter their behavior to gain from the policy) and
political-economy  constraints  (whereby  the "land-rich"  undermine  the policy by political means).
We have not tried to resolve all these issues, but rather to inform the debate by quantifying
the potential  gains from this type of policy under seemingly  ideal conditions, incorporating  only a
limited  set of the constraints  that such a policy would actually  face.  Thus our aim has been to
quantify gains to the poor from a benchmark  policy, designed  to characterize  the likely upper-bound
to real-world  outcomes. The key constraint we consider is intrinsic  to such schemes, namely that the
targeting is done on the basis of landholding  class alone.  Ignoring  productivity  differentials, the
relevant indicator in making transfers is a suitably defined  poverty measure for each landholding
class.  That was the approach  of Ravallion  (1989). The more general formulation  we have offered
here calls ,or two indicators: the marginal  productivity  of transfers (assumed  to be proportional  to
current output per acre on owned land, though recognizing  that this may well entail an over-
estimation  of the impact  on poverty)  and the poverty measure (as derived from a standard poverty
profile).
On applying this approach  to new data for rizral  Bangladesh,  we have found that landholding
class is a relevant  indicator for targeting. Under these idealized  conditions, redistributions  from land-
rich to land-poor  households  will reduce aggregate  poverty in rural Bangladesh  (even without
productivity  effects). And transfers from an external  budget would have greatest impact on poverty if
concentrated  on the landless and marginal  farners.  Furthermore, productivity  effects (consistent  with
the farm size-productivity  relationship  in Bangladesh)  do imply an additional  impact  on rural poverty
22However, our mo.e interesting  findings concern  the quantitative  impact on poverty of this
type of policy.  We have tried to err on the side of over-estimating  the impact  on poverty, by
ignoring  constraints  which would reduce that impaict. Yet we find that the gains are modest, even
when one postulates  virtually un-heard  of powers of redistribution  across landholding  classes.
Depen ...g on the initial conditions  of agricultural  technology,  and the size of the productivity  effects
among  the landless, we estimate that the maximum  impact  on rural poverty from this type of policy
under revenue neutrality is equivalent  to that of a uniform lump-sum  transfer of between  Tk 10 and
Tk 20 per person per month - around 2.5-5% of mean rural consumption. The conclusions  of the
earlier study (Ravallion, 1989)  are reinforced by these new results; indeed, the impact  on poverty of
land-based  targeting is even lower on the more recent and improved  data set used here.
The various factors that we have omitted from the analysis  will further constrain  the impact.
Differences  in the way land-based  transfers are used, and in land quality, will dampen it, as will
plausible political-economy  constraints  and incentive  effects on landholding  behavior. And we have
said nothing about the administrative  costs.  These considerations  lead us to suspect that, on balance,
our simulations  may not be far off the mark iP.  quantifying  the best one could expect from this type of
policy.  For the sake of Bangladesh's  poor, one must hope it is not all that is done to attack rural
poverty.
23Appendix:  The Numerical  Method of Solving  for the Unconstrained  Optimal  Allocation  with
Productivity  Effects
The problem is solved by linearizing  the first-order  conditions  at each iteration around the
previous estimate  of the optimal  allocation x'  and the Lagrange multiplier  on the budget constr Int A.
The algorithm  estimates  these variables  at each iteration t  by solving the following  system of linear
approximations  to first-order  conditions  (generalizing  the Ravallion, 1989, algorithm  to include the
productivity  weights):
[(K-1) zaj []  ; = '
where (&I)  is the m2 diagonal matrix with diagonal  elements  given by the values of ke 2.H,,_  for
i=l,...,m) as implied  by the values of x  obtained  at iteration t-1;  g!  X is the column vector of m
elements  formed by kXz-j,. 1 )H;,  l for i=1,...m, as obtained  at t-l  (where ?  is mean income  of the
poor in landholding  class i), while a=(n,...,n,), and i  is an m row vector of ones.  Having solved for x'
to the desired degree of accuracy, the problem can be repeated,  constraining  the solution to non-
negative values  of xj@  for all j  if this does not already hold.
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26Table 1: Poverty  profile by landholding  class, rural Bangladesh,  1988/89
Land-holding  class  Percent  of  Mean  expenditure  Head-count  Poverty  gap  Squared  poverty-
(acres of owned land)  Population  per person  index of poverty  index  gap index population  (Tk/mm)  (%)  (%)  (xlOO)
1. Landless  13.9  377  61.4  17.7  6.9
(0-0.04)
2. Near landless  31.5  404  53.9  14.6  5.4
(0.05-0.49)
3. Marginal  19.2  438  43.4  10.2  3.5
(0.50-1.49)
4. Small  11.3  498  34.2  6.2  1.5
(1.50-2.49)
5. Medium  18.8  545  26.6  5.2  1.5
(2.50-7.49)
6. Large  (7.50+)  5.3  790  10.1  2.1  0.8
Rural Bangladesh  100.0  435  47.5  12.2  4.5
Source:  The poverty  estimates  are based on the distributions  of household  consumption  per capita constructed  by the Bangladesh  Bureau  of Statistics;  see
BBS  (1991).Table 2a: Farn size and land productivity in Bangladesh
Technologically  developed  Technologically  underdeveloped
Farm size  villages  villages
(acres)  Local  Modem  All rice  Local  Modem  All rice
varieties  varieties  varieties  varieties  varieties  varieties
Small  0.63  1.53  0.73  0.72  1.29  1.10
(under 2.5)  (0.09)  (0.38)  (0.10)  (0.08)  (0.13)  (0.11)
Medium  0.53  1.37  0.58  0.71  1.13  0.93
(2.5-5.0)  (0.07)  (0.41)  (0.09)  (0.09)  (0.13)  (0.08)
Large  0.51  1.06  0.57  0.61  1.09  0.86
(over 5.0)  (0.12)  (0.77)  (0.13)  (0.14)  (0.24)  (0.20)
All farms  0.58  1.43  0.64  0.71  1.23  1.03
(0.06)  (0.26)  (0.07)  (0.06)  (0.09)  (0.08)
Note: Productivity  in annual metric tons of rice per acre; figures in parentheses  are standard
errors.
Source: Hossain (1988), based on a 1982  field survey done by Bangladesh  Institute of
Development  Studies and the International  Food Policy Research  Institute.Table 2b: Productivity weights
Technologically  Technologically
Landholding  class (acres of  developed  areas  underdeveloped  areas
owned land)
Local  Modem  Local  Modem
varieties  varieties  varieties  varieties
Landless  (0-0.04)  B: 1.23  B: 1.44  B: 1.18  B: 1.18
and  L: 1.00  L: 1.00  L: 1.00  L: 1.00
near landless (0.05 - 0.49)  H: 1.41  H: 1.80  H: 1.31  H: 1.30
Marginal (0.50-  1.49)
and  1.23  1.44  1.18  1.18
small (1.50 - 2.40)
Medium (2.50 - 7.49)  1.04  1.29  1.16  1.04
Large (7.50 +)  i.00  1.00  1.00  1.00
Note:  B =  "'base-case"  weights  for landless  and near landless
L =  "low-case"  weights  for landless  and near-landless
H =  "high-case"  weights  for landless  and near-landlessTable 3: LIand-contingent  poverty alleviation  schemes  with and without  productivity  effect under alternative  technological regimes  ("base-case'  productivity  weights  from Table 2b)
Optimal  transfers  without  Optimal  transfers  with productivity  effects  under  unrestricted  land-based  taxation productivity  effects
under  unrestricted
land-based  taxation  Technologically  underdeveloped  areas  Technologically  developed  areas (Scenario  I)
Landholding  Pre-transfer
class (acres of owned  poverty Pz  Local variety  Modem variety  Local variety  Modzrn variety land)  (x 100)  Optimal  Post-  (Scenario  2)  (Scenario  3)  (Scenario  4)  (Scenario  5) transfer  transfer
(Tk/mnt  poverty  Optimal  Post  Optimal  Post-  Optimal  Post-  Optimal  Post- person)  transfer  transfer  transfer  transfer  transfer  transfer  transfer  transfer (Tkimn/  Poverty  (Tkimn/  Poverty  (Tk/mn/  Poverty  (Tk/mn/  poverty person)  person)  person)  person)
I. Landless
(0 - 0.04)  6.95  48.91  3.12  44.55  2.80  38.54  2.76  43.18  3.01  45.19  2.88
2. Near Landless
(0.05 - 0.49)  5.45  29.48  3.38  29.05  3.04  25.34  3.00  26.82  3.26  28.96  3.12
3. Marginal
(0.50 -1.49)  3.49  -2.88  3.49  2.71  3.15  2.84  3.11  -0.61  3.37  1.51  3.24
4. Small
(1.50  -2.40)  1.53  -42.60  3.45  -29.58  3.11  -24.74  3.07  -34.27  3.33  -32.14  3.19
5. Medium
(2.50 - 7.49)  1.53  -60.53  3.77  -66.57  4.29  -48.83  3.91  -51.54  3.73  -64.50  4.16
6. Large
(7.50+)  0.83  -158.44  5.49  -175.17  6.48  -195.20  7.86  -176.08  6.54  -172.22  6.30
Rural  Bangladesh  4.45  0  3.49  0  3,32  0  3.28  0  3,42  0  3.36
Equivalent  Gain
(Tk/monthlperson)  - 10.77  - 13.85  14.68  . 12.00  13.04  -Table 4a: Land-contingent  poverty alleviation schemes with and without productvity effects under alternative  technological  regimes (Nlow-case  I scenario)
Optimal  transfers  without  Optimal  transfers with productivity  effects under unrestricted  land-based  taxation
productivity  effects  _
under  unrestricted  Technologically  underdeveloped  areas  Technologically  developed  areas land-based  taxation
Landholding  Pre-transfer  L class  (acres  of owned  Poverty  P 2 Local  variety  Modem  varieq  Locl  variety  Modem  variety land)  (xl00)  Optimal  Post-
transfer  transfer
(TkImnJ  Poverty  Optimal  Post  Optimal  Post-  Optimal  Post-  Optimal  Post- person)  transfer  transfer  tansfer  transfer  transfer  tansfer  transfer  transfer
(TkImni/  poverty  (Tk/mnl  poverty  (rkmn/  poverty  (Tk/mnl  poverty
person)  person)  person)  person)
I. Landless
0 - 0.04  6.95  48.91  3.12  43.05  3.46  35.75  3.93  41.78  3.54  43.94  3.41
2. Near  Landless
(0.05  -0.49)  5.45  29.48  3.38  23.24  3.75  15.59  4.24  21.90  3.83  24.19  3.69
3.  Marginal
(0.50  -1.49)  3.49  -2.88  3.49  6.84  2.89  9.81  2.62  3.23  3.13  5.01  3.02
4.  Small
(1.50  - 2.40)  1.53  42.60  3.45  -25.46  2.85  -17.63  2.56  -30.43  3.08  -28.65  2.97
5.  Medium
(2.50  - 7.49)  1.53  -60.53  3.77  -60.98  3.94  40.17  3.30  47.39  3.46  -60.04  3.88
6.  Large
(7.50+)  0.83  -158.44  5.49  -167.20  6.00  -178.13  6.67  -169.19  6.11  -165.87  5.91
Rural  Bangladesh  4.45  0  3.49  0  3.55  0  3.65  0  3.59  0  3.54
Equivalent  Gain
(C/kmonth/person)  - 10.77  - 9.76  7.91  - 8.92  - 9.83Table 4b: Land-contingent  poverty alleviation schemes with and without  productivity effects under alternative  technological  regimes ("high-case" scenario)
Optimal transfers without  Optimal transfers with productivity  effects under unrestricted land-based  taxation productivity  effects  ,
under  unrestricted  Technologically  underdeveloped  areas  Technologically  developed  areas land-based  taxation_
Landholding  Pre-transfer
class (acres  of owned  Poverty P2 Local variety  Modern  variety  Local variety  Modem variety land)  (xl00)  Optimal  Post-
transfer  transfer  _
(TkImnI  Poverty  Optimal  Post  Optimal  Post-  Optimal  Post-  Optimal  Post- person)  transfer  transfer  transfer  transfer  transfer  transfer  transfer  transfer (Tklmn/  poverty  (Tk/ninl  poverty  (Tk/mn/  poverty  (Tk/mnJ  poverty
person)  person)  person)  person)
I. Landless
0 - 0.04  6.95  48.91  3.12  44.84  2.37  38.61  2.09  43.66  2.68  45.55  2.57
2. Near Landless
(0.05 - 0.49)  5.45  29.48  3.38  31.69  2.59  28.52  2.30  29.23  2.90  31.10  2.80
3.  Marginal
(0.50 -1.49)  3.49  -2.88  3.49  0.96  3.27  0.83  3.27  -2.42  3.49  0.02  3.33
4.  Small
(1.50 - 2.40)  1.53  -42.60  3.45  -31.33  3.22  -26.75  3.22  -36.08  3.45  -33.63  3.29
5.  Medium
(2.50 - 7.49)  1.53  -60.53  3.77  -68.95  4.45  -51.33  4.10  -53.50  3.86  -66.40  4.28
6.  Large
(7.50+)  0.83  -158.44  5.49  .178.55  6.70  -200.12  8.24  -179.36  6.75  -174.92  6.47
Rural Bangladesh  4.45  0  3.49  0  3.16  0  3.01  0  3.30  0  3.25
Equivalent  Gain
(Tl/monthlperson)  - 10.77  - 16.97  - 19.93  - 14.24  - 15.21  -Table 5: Simulated effects of land-contingent  poveny reduction schemes  for Bangladesh, 1988/89
Landholding  class  Pre-transfer  Scheme  I  Scheme  2  Scheme  3  Scheme  4  Scheme  5  Scheme  6
(acres)  P 2 index  (x=46)  (x=46)
(xlIOO)  - 2  *  ;  X
1. Landless  6.9  48.9  3.1  31.2  4.2  39.1  3.7  46.3  3.3  85.3  1.5  46.0  3.3
(0-0.04)
2. Near landless  5.4  29.5  3.4  10.8  4.6  19.2  4.0  26.6  3.5  68.0  1.7  46.0  2.5
(0.05-0.49)
3. Marginal  3.5  -2.9  3.5  -20.0  4.6  -13.2  4.1  -5.7  3.7  36.4  1.7  46.0  1.4
(0.50-1.49)
4. Small  1.5  -42.6  3.5  -20.0  2.3  -40.0  3.3  45.4  3.6  0  1.6  46.0  0.5
(1.50-2.49)
5. Medium  1.5  -60.5  3.8  -20.0  1.9  40.0  2.7  -63.5  3.9  0  1.4  46.0  0.5
(2.50-7.49)
6. Large  0.8  -158.4  5.5  -20.0  1.1  -40.0  1.4  -80.0  2.3  0  0.8  46.0  0.4
(7.50+)
Rural Bangladesh  4.5  0.0  3.5  0.0  3.8  0  3.6  0  3.5  46.0  1.6  46.0  1.9
Equivalent  gain  - 10.8  - 5.8  - 8.3  - 10.0  - 10.2  - - -
(Tk/month/person)
x denotes  the poverty  minimizing  transfer (Tklmonth/person),  P 2 denotes  the post-transfer  poverty  index (xlOO).Table 6: Sensitivity  of scheme 5, Table 5, to alternative  poverty lines and budgets
Landholding  class  Alternative  poverty  lines  Alternative  budgets
(acres)  (x  =40)  (z=370)
z=270  z=400  z=470  x=20  x=60  x=80
1. Landless  68.4  78.7  80.6  50.5  101.1  119.7
(0-0.04)
2. Near landless  60.9  59.3  59.0  31.1  85.7  106.8
(0.05-0.49)
3. Marginal  33.9  26.9  25.5  0.0  54.0  75.3
(0.50-1.49)
4. Small  0.0  0.0  0.0  0.0  15.0  36.4
(1.50-2.49)
5. Medium  0.0  0.0  0.0  0.0  5.5  21.7
(2.50-7.49)
6. Large  (7.50+)  0.0  0.0  0.0  0.0  0.0  0.0
Post-transfer  P 2 2.3  2.6  5.3  2.7  1.1  0.7
(xlOO)
Equivalent  gain  11.3  8.6  6.9  5.9  11.6  11.4
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